Instructions for assignment
Module Assignment: Essay
Read On Point II, Combat Studies Institute Press.
In this case study, GEN Franks (CENTCOM Commander) addresses PH IV (Stability Operations of the campaign plan and uses his operational art and command experience to describe his vision of how this phase will be accomplished. GEN Franks stated that “Phase IV would be relatively short,” obviously he made this assumption based on the speed in which the forces accomplished PH III.
After reading this case study answer the following questions:
1. What is your opinion of GEN Frank’s statement?
2. Did this line of thinking add to the difficulty of planning for Stability Operations?
3. How did this unexpected transition affect personnel requirements for the newly designated CJTF-7?
4. What would you have done to help assist your commander during this transition to Phase IV?
Assignment Instructions: The essay will be in APA format, a title page, a reference page, and 3 to 4 pages of content (does not include the cover and reference pages). You will use Times New Roman, 12-font, and double-spaced. Do not try to cover everything. Focus on the factors you consider most important in analyzing your historical event. You will use a minimum of six resources for your paper.
Note 1: Please use the rubrics (see below) and the example APA paper_APA style, 6th Edition (see below), when writing the essay.
Note 2: Need a strong thesis statement in the last line of the opening paragraph and the first line in the conclusion.
Note 3: Paper must have at least four level one headings, including the Conclusion. Refer to Purdue Owl APA style, 6th Edition.
The sources below must be used for this assignment. You may also use other sources related to the topic to meet the # of resources required.
On Point II, Combat Studies Institute Press (complete copy link and excerpt)
JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (complete copy link)
Department of Defense. (2017, July 12). Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1). Retrieved from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf
JP 3-07 STABILITY (complete copy link)
Department of Defense (2016). Stability (JP 3-07). Retrieved from: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_07.pdf
ADP 3-07 Stability (complete copy link)
Department of the Army (2019). Stability (ADP 3-07). Retrieved from: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18011_ADP%203-07%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf
JP 3-31, C2 Joint for Joint Land Operations (extract)
Transitioning from a Division/Corps (G) Staff to a Joint (J) Staff
On Point II_Combat
these important CPA decisions created a pool of disaffected and unemployed Sunni Arabs from which a growing insurgency could later recruit.
That month also saw the CPA begin preparing for the establishment of an interim Iraqi gov- erning body. Many Iraqi politicians, especially expatriates who were influential in the decision to intervene in Iraq, had expected the Coalition to form a provisional Iraqi governing entity soon after the military victory over Saddam. However, in the middle of the month, Bremer reversed Garner’s plans for an early turnover of political power and announced the indefinite postpone- ment of the formation of an Interim Iraqi Government. Instead of a temporary Iraqi sovereign body, the CPA would continue to serve as the chief political authority and the Coalition armed forces as the military arm of that authority. This decision, in the eyes of many Iraqis, trans- formed the intent of United Nations (UN) Resolution 1483, which recognized the United States and Great Britain as “occupying powers” and urged the two powers to promote the welfare of Iraqis and to administer the country until Iraqis were capable of self-governance.3 The resolu- tion appeared to formalize the sense that the Coalition powers were acting like occupiers rather than liberators, and this perception fueled the disaffection of some in Iraq.
Military Transitions in Spring 2003 During the 6 weeks following the toppling of the Saddam regime, as the CPA arrived and
ORHA departed, Coalition military forces quickly established their presence in the capital city and throughout Iraq, preparing for what came next. Still, the role of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s military forces in the next stage of the campaign remained unclear. During the initial planning that led to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, tasked Third Army/CFLCC to lead the postinvasion phase of the campaign known as Phase IV, Transition, in joint doctrine terminology, which CENTCOM believed would be relatively short. Once CENTCOM concluded its postconflict operations, CFLCC would pass responsibility for the longer, more complex reconstruction and stabiliza- tion effort to a combined joint task force (CJTF). The DOD gave this joint task force a vari- ety of names, designating it first as Combined Joint Task Force–Iraq and later as Combined Joint Task Force–7 (CJTF-7). However, planners at the DOD and CENTCOM had focused on Phase III, Decisive Operations, of the campaign and, consequently, had invested only a limited amount of time and resources in the organization and manning of this joint task force.
In April the Third Army had been serving as the CFLCC, the headquarters responsible for Coalition land forces in Iraq under CENTCOM. General Franks told his subordinate leaders during a 16 April visit to Baghdad to be prepared to conduct an abbreviated period of stability operations and then to redeploy the majority of their forces out of Iraq by September 2003. In line with the prewar planning and general euphoria at the rapid crumbling of the Saddam regime, Franks continued to plan for a very limited role for US ground forces in Iraq.4
Following Franks’ intent, CFLCC planners started preparations to redeploy, and soon the 3d Infantry Division (3d ID) and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF) received orders to begin their own preparations for leaving Iraq. In fact, the desire to reduce US forces in Iraq was so strong that after listening to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld voice con- cerns about deploying the 1st Cavalry Division (1st CAV), already loading its equipment in the United States for movement to Iraq, Franks recommended to the Secretary in late April that the division stay stateside.5 This decision stemmed from the belief, at the national level, that 1st CAV’s Soldiers would not be needed to stabilize Iraq.6
Overview of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: May 2003 to January 2005
Franks also wanted the Third Army/CFLCC out of Iraq as soon as possible and returned to its normal role in support of land operations throughout the CENTCOM area of operations (AO), which included Afghanistan. By the second week of May, V Corps commander Lieutenant General William Wallace received confir- mation that his headquarters would serve as the core of CJTF-7, the Phase IV military headquarters tasked to replace Third Army/CFLCC in Iraq.7 In late April Wallace learned that he would be replaced as com- mander of V Corps by Major General Ricardo Sanchez, then commanding the 1st Armored Division (1st AD), heading to Iraq from Germany. No new CJTF headquar- ters would be coming to Iraq after all. V Corps, which would not be officially designated as CJTF-7 until 15 June, was to operate under the political guidance of ORHA and Jay Garner. ORHA also expected to have a short lifespan, turning over political power to a new Iraqi Government by the end of the summer.
In late April CFLCC remained in charge of Coalition ground forces, but was beginning to transfer responsibility to V Corps and preparing to redeploy to the United States. It provided only limited guidance to the tactical units that fanned out across Iraq. Even without a detailed mission and guidelines on how to conduct the next phase, by the beginning of May US Army divisions took positions across the country and began executing a variety of operations. The 101st Airborne Division (101st ABN) established itself in the northwest of the country around the city of Mosul. To its southeast, the 173d Airborne assumed responsibility for the city and environs of Kirkuk. In the area between Kirkuk and Baghdad, a region known as the Sunni Triangle, the 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) set up a sprawling presence. In Al Anbar province, to the west of the Sunni heartland, the 3d ID and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) began operating in cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi. The 1st AD, soon to be augmented by the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2d ACR) and the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2d BCT) of the 82d Airborne Division (82d ABN), moved into Baghdad to begin its operations in the Iraqi capital. (See Appendix C, Map of Unit Areas of Responsibility, 2003–2004.) Across these areas of responsibility (AOR), the special operations Soldiers of the newly established Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), created when CJSOTF- North and CJSOTF-West were combined, began conducting reconnaissance, psychological operations, and the hunt for high-value targets.
Of course the US Army was not alone in this early stage of postinvasion operations. To the south of Baghdad, the 1st MEF took up positions in the region around Karbala and An Najaf. In the southeastern corner of Iraq, centered in the city of Basrah, the British 1st Armoured Division established its AOR. At the end of May 2003, approximately 160,000 Coalition troops had spread out across Iraq to begin postconflict efforts.8 Eventually, as more Coalition troops entered Iraq in the summer of 2003, CJTF-7, the Coalition military headquarters established in June 2003, redesignated all areas of operation as multinational division AORs. By the fall of 2003, CJTF-7 had divided Iraq into six AORs: Multi-National Division–North (MND-N),
Figure 8. General Tommy Franks.
f w w