Government
REPORT
DOES INTENT EQUAL CAPABILITY?
Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell
The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the
foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of
al-Qaeda’s expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians.
In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group’s ongoing quest for
WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or
obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD
against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda’s current
WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its
explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN
agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda’s consideration
of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and
disseminated in the group’s own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the
history of al-Qaeda’s interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network’s attitude toward these
weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of
WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production
instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda’s own literature and
websites.
KEYWORDS: Al-Qaeda; Terrorism; WMD terrorism; Nuclear; Biological; Chemical; Radiological;
CBRN; Terrorist manuals; Uranium; Radium; Plague; Ricin; Cyanide; Hydrogen sulfide; Mustard
gas; Botulinum toxin; Cesium 137; RDD; Dirty bomb; Osama Bin Laden; Abu Musab – al
Zarqawi; Nuclear preparation encyclopedia; WMD Fatwa
The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the foremost
danger to U.S. national security. During the 2004 U.S. presidential debates, the danger of
WMD terrorism was one of the few topics on which both candidates agreed. Since the
September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States, this danger has become more
realistic because of al-Qaeda’s expanding global network and its expressed willingness to
kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, there have been numerous media reports
concerning the group’s ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed
al-Qaeda members’ attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use as a weapon of mass destruction against
targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda’s current
WMD capability match its actual intent?
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 3, November 2005 ISSN 1073-6700 print/ISSN 1746-1766 online/05/030615-39
– 2005 The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
DOI: 10.1080/10736700600601236
While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD,
allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few
open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda’s consideration of
WMD and most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and
disseminated in the group’s own literature and manuals. Yet monitoring and analysis of
primary al-Qaeda literature provides the most revealing window into the actual
motivations, goals, and capabilities of al-Qaeda.
It is not the objective of this report to examine al-Qaeda’s ability and desire to target
chemical and nuclear facilities within the United States. The prospect of such incidents is
worthy of separate and lengthy in-depth investigation and is beyond the scope of this
particular research. Nor is it the intent of this report to explore alleged weaknesses of
certain American industries to a WMD attack, a topic that has recently attracted much
attention in the U.S. news. This report will examine the history of al-Qaeda’s interest in
CBRN agents, the evolution of the network’s attitude toward these weapons, and the
internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so,
the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and
capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda’s own literature, manuals, and
websites. This sort of analysis on issues of nonproliferation and international terrorism is
not often covered in open-source research.
What is al-Qaeda?
Al-Qaeda is a Sunni Salafi Jihadi network with affiliates and supporters spread all over the
globe. The network formed its roots during the 1980s when Islamist ideologues began to
recruit fighters from the Muslim world to oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the
years that followed and up to today, al-Qaeda has continued to attract supporters around
the world with its international jihadist ideology. The group has gained much publicity in
the past decade following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the
9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Whereas al-Qaeda is often envisioned as a well-defined group, it can be more
accurately described as a loosely affiliated network with very little hierarchical structure.
The diffused nature of the group poses many obstacles to intelligence collection and has
resulted in myriad contradictory and sensationalist accounts in open-source literature.
Many reports concerning al-Qaeda’s capability to conduct future attacks are focused on a
potential WMD capability. While the use of CBRN agents is a real security concern, the al-
Qaeda network is more likely to conduct future attacks by utilizing conventional weapons
in unconventional ways.
Al-Qaeda aims to expel Westerners and Muslims deemed ‘‘un-Islamic’’ from Muslim
countries and impose Islamic rule on countries in the Middle East. The group’s primary
goal during the 1990s was to force U.S. military and civilian establishments out of Saudi
Arabia.1 Since then, al-Qaeda’s objective has expanded to include the establishment of a
worldwide Islamic community, based on the concept of the umma (global caliphate).2
Current al-Qaeda affiliates aim to replace current, ‘‘corrupt’’ Islamic regimes and secular
Arab regimes with Shari’a Islamic law and to bring under control the regions of the world
616 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
that were once under Muslim rule.3 A commonly cited, long-term goal is to undermine
Western hegemony by targeting U.S. allies as well as U.S. military establishments and
civilian populations.4 Osama bin Laden, the most prominent leader of the al-Qaeda
network, has specifically identified the United States as the ‘‘great Satan’’ and has called for
armed struggle against the country and its allies.5
The al-Qaeda network has historically supported three different kinds of militant
groups: those who target Muslim regimes viewed as ‘‘apostates’’ (e.g., Egypt, Saudi
Arabia); those struggling to create their own Islamic state (e.g., Chechnya); and those who
aim to overthrow regimes that are believed to repress their Muslim populations (e.g.,
Indonesia, Kosovo).6 Network affiliates and supporters are encouraged to wage an armed
jihad, or holy war, against all enemies of Islam.7
Al-Qaeda Affiliates Worldwide
Al-Qaeda proper is in essence the 1998 union of bin Laden’s original al-Qaeda and Ayman
al-Zawahiri’s branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This union is now known as Qa’idat al-
Jihad, although the global network itself is still often referred to as al-Qaeda. As a global
movement, al-Qaeda affiliates include, but are not limited to, the following Salafi Jihadi
groups:
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade (al-Qaeda in Europe), Ansar al-Sunna (Iraq), and the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) have also been identified as network
affiliates.9 In addition to these identifiable groups, there are numerous ‘‘freelance’’ al-
Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea, Jordan, Kosovo,
Pakistan, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen. Al-Qaeda cells have reportedly been disbanded
in Albania, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Current reports estimate that al-Qaeda affiliates operate in roughly 65 countries
around the globe.
. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
. Jamiat-ul-Ulema (Pakistan)
. Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen)
. Salafist Group for Preaching & Combat (Algeria)
. Groupe Tunisien Islamique (Tunisia)
. Ansar al-Islam (Iraq)
. al-Tawhid wal Jihad (or al-Qaeda in Iraq)
. Eastern Turkistan Liberation (China)
. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
. Harkat al-Mujahideen (Kashmir)
. Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (Morocco)8
. Jihad Movement (Bangladesh)
. Jemaah Islamiyyah (Indonesia)
. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Libya)
. al-Qaeda fi Jazirat al-Arab (Saudi Arabia)
. Usbat al-Ansar (Lebanon)
. Islamic Movement of Turkistan
. Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)
. Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir)
. Lashkar-e-Taiba (Kashmir)
. Jama’at al-Fuqra (Kashmir)
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 617
Overview of Allegations Concerning al-Qaeda and WMD
The al-Qaeda network poses a significant WMD terror threat, not only because of the
group’s extensive resources, but also because of its expressed desire to use WMD against
its enemies.10 There is evidence that al-Qaeda remains committed to acquiring CBRN
agents and has actively pursued the materials required to weaponize such agents. Equally
disconcerting is the wealth of technical information being disseminated to potential
supporters outlining the steps necessary to produce both chemical and biological (CB)
agents. There have been no reported cases of al-Qaeda affiliates using weaponized CBRN
agents in a terrorist attack. However, there is evidence of multiple attempts to acquire and
weaponize CBRN agents and efforts to disseminate technical information to supporters.
The host of allegations regarding al-Qaeda and CBRN agents ranges from the mid-1990s to
the present and mostly consists of attempts by al-Qaeda cells or affiliates to acquire
biological agents, various toxic chemicals, radiological material, and uranium. Other
allegations include plots to use biological and chemical agents in a terror attack as well as
plans to attack nuclear facilities.11
The specific biological and chemical agents reportedly pursued by al-Qaeda affiliates
are, respectively, anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, ricin, yersinia pestis, mustard gas,
potassium cyanide, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide, sodium nitrate, sodium peroxide,
sodium oxide, sarin, and VX. The majority of reports involving CBRN materials are
uncorroborated and remain largely speculative.
Chemical Agents
Most reports concerning al-Qaeda’s chemical weapons (CW) efforts state simply that there
is proof that al-Qaeda is interested in producing or acquiring chemical weapons. Indeed,
the 11th volume of al-Qaeda’s Encyclopedia of Jihad discusses how to construct chemical
and biological weapons (CBW).12 Additionally, Osama bin Laden, himself, has stated that
acquiring weapons, including nuclear and chemical weapons, is a Muslim ‘‘religious
duty.’’13 In an interview in 2001 with a Pakistani journalist, bin Laden claimed, ‘‘We have
chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we
reserve the right to use them.’’14 The majority of reports concerning al-Qaeda’s chemical
weapons capability indicate that the network has researched the production of chemical
agents, but has not been able to weaponize such agents.
Most cases involving chemical substances entail the use of cyanide in experiments
on animals. One eyewitness account came from Ahmad Rassam, who pleaded guilty in
2001 to plotting to attack Los Angeles International Airport. During his trial, Rassam
claimed that he had witnessed an experiment in which cyanide was used to gas a dog.15 It
is unclear how many experiments have been conducted with cyanide, but videotapes
allegedly recorded by al-Qaeda affiliates prior to 2001 show dogs being gassed with crude
chemicals. Experts have claimed that the substance used was either a crude nerve agent or
hydrogen cyanide gas.16 Other reports claim that al-Qaeda had planned to use cyanide,
sarin, or osmium tetroxide against large numbers of people in government buildings,
transportation hubs, and shopping centers in Britain, Jordan, and the United States.17
618 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
There have been specific reports of attempts to produce or acquire cyanide
compounds, as well as plots to use cyanide in terrorist attacks. In 2002, British authorities
arrested three men who were allegedly planning to use cyanide in an attack on the
London subway system.18 A series of reports in 2004 indicated that U.S. troops in Iraq
discovered three kilograms of cyanide at the home of an al-Qaeda affiliate.19 There are also
reports of attempted acquisition of hydrogen cyanide; however, this substance would
have to be disseminated in a high concentration in order to cause casualties. Additionally,
the gas emits a strong odor of bitter almonds, thus increasing the chance that victims may
be able to evacuate the area before the substance becomes lethal.20 Al-Qaeda has also
attempted to procure potassium cyanide, which can be used for cutaneous contamination
if mixed with the right chemicals. However, since the substance may appear wet or greasy,
it is likely that an individual who has come into contact with the substance would take
notice and wash the affected area of skin immediately. For this reason, potassium cyanide
is unlikely to cause mass casualties.21 There are also indications that al-Qaeda has pursued
toxic industrial chemicals, such as those used in a foiled attack on government targets in
Jordan in April 2004.
Biological Agents
The majority of allegations concerning al-Qaeda’s biological endeavors mention attempts
to procure and weaponize anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, and ricin.22 Many reports
have focused on the former Soviet Union (FSU) as a source of these biological agents. In
the mid-1990s, bin Laden associates allegedly attempted to ‘‘purchase’’ anthrax bacteria
and yersinia pestis (plague) in Kazakhstan.23 Some sources reported in 1999 that al-Qaeda
members obtained the Ebola virus and salmonella bacteria from countries of the FSU,
anthrax bacteria from East Asia, and botulinum toxin from the Czech Republic.24 In late
2001, U.S. officials in Afghanistan reported evidence indicating that Russian scientists were
assisting al-Qaeda militants in the weaponization of anthrax bacteria.25
In 2001, there were several indications that al-Qaeda had a continued interest in
acquiring a biological weapon (BW) capability. For one, Mohammad Atta and Zacharias
Moussaoui expressed interest in crop dusters prior to the 9/11 attacks.26 The same year, al-
Qaeda associate Ahmad Rassam testified that bin Laden was interested in acquiring
aircraft to disseminate biological agents at low altitude.27 Also in 2001, interrogations of
two captured militants in Malaysia led to allegations that al-Qaeda affiliate group Jemaah
Islamiyah was attempting to procure and weaponize biological agents.28 Around the same
time, U.S. operatives reported that multiple residences in Afghanistan, including al-
Zawahiri’s alleged residence in Kabul, tested positive for traces of anthrax bacteria.29
The network would need significant technical assistance to weaponize biological
agents for use in a terrorist attack. Anthrax bacteria can be harmful if dispersed in aerosol
form, or by personal contact. While anthrax bacteria in aerosol form is lethal, it is extremely
difficult to weaponize Bacillus anthracis spores so they maintain virulence and are easily
dispersed. Spore size is crucial to successful deployment of this agent. Botulinum toxin can
be difficult to procure through the soil, deteriorates quickly, and is very difficult to use as a
WMD. Yet it can be used effectively in aerosol attacks in closed spaces or in small-scale
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 619
poisonings.30 The biological toxin ricin can be extracted from castor beans, and while
deadly, it is only suitable for targeted poisonings as it is not contagious.
Radiological Materials
Although there is strong evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda has attempted to procure
radiological material, there is no indication that the network has been successful in this
endeavor. As with claims of chemical and biological acquisition, many of the allegations
surrounding al-Qaeda’s procurement of radiological material focus on Afghanistan and
countries of the FSU. British authorities claimed to have discovered documents suggesting
that the network had constructed a radiological dispersion device, or ‘‘dirty bomb,’’ at an
unspecified location in Afghanistan.31 These reports have not been corroborated. Many
allegations concerning al-Qaeda’s pursuit of radiological material stem from interrogations
of militants arrested over the past several years.
In April 2001, Bulgarian businessman Ivan Ivanov reportedly told authorities that he
had met bin Laden in China, near the Pakistan border, to discuss business plans for an
‘‘environmental’’ company to purchase nuclear waste.32 In April 2002, another al-Qaeda
member, Abu Zubayda, claimed that the network had the knowledge to construct a dirty
bomb and hinted that there may be such a device hidden in the United States.33 A more
well-publicized case occurred in May 2002 with the arrest of al-Qaeda affiliate Abdullah al-
Muhajir (José Padilla) in Chicago. Padilla claimed that he was part of an al-Qaeda plot to
detonate a radiological dispersal device in the United States. He had reportedly attempted
to acquire radiological material in Canada.34 Reports in early 2004 indicate that al-Qaeda
affiliate Midhat Mursi (Abu Khabab) may have constructed a radiological dispersal device.
Mursi allegedly maintains links with al-Zawahiri.35 British officials arrested eight men in
June 2004 after the discovery of information on explosives, chemicals, and radiological
materials and building plans of the New York Stock Exchange, the International Monetary
Fund in Washington, D.C., the Citigroup building in New York, and the Prudential building
in New Jersey.36 Reports in late 2004 suggest that an al-Qaeda affiliate by the name of
Walid al-Misri told investigators that bin Laden may have purchased radiological material
from contacts in Chechnya.37
Nuclear Materials
There are many exaggerated accounts of al-Qaeda procuring both radiological and nuclear
material in the form of an ‘‘off-the-shelf’’ explosive device.38 Reports in 1998 indicated that
bin Laden had plans to acquire nuclear material from Chechen contacts as well as contacts
in Kazakhstan.39 Reports in 2000 allege that bin Laden sent associates to acquire enriched
uranium from unspecified Eastern European countries.40 There were also accounts in 2001
and 2002 that bin Laden had obtained enriched uranium rods and/or a suitcase nuclear
weapon from the Russian mafia as well as a Russian-made ‘‘suitcase nuke’’ from Central
Asian sources.41 Also in 2001, reports surfaced that Pakistani scientists had shared nuclear
information with bin Laden.42 U.S. authorities have also stated that Pakistani businessman
Saifullah Paracha gave al-Qaeda associates information on where to obtain nuclear
620 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
weapons. Although Paracha later denied the allegations, he admitted to meeting bin
Laden in 1999 to consider a potential business deal.43 Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir
reported in 2004 that al-Zawahiri had claimed in an interview that the al-Qaeda network
had acquired nuclear weapons from Central Asia. The al-Qaeda deputy leader allegedly
told Mir that affiliates had traveled to ‘‘Moscow, Tashkent, [and] countries in Central Asia’’
with the intent to purchase ‘‘portable nuclear material.’’44
Al-Qaeda’s interest in pursuing nuclear weapons is made obvious by statements
posted on websites and testimonies from al-Qaeda operatives. In 2001, Jamal al-Fadl
claimed that he was responsible for investigating the purchase of uranium to be used in
the construction of a nuclear device in the early 1990s.45 Reports surfaced in 2004 that al-
Qaeda had purchased nuclear devices from the Ukraine in 1998. (Ukrainian officials
claimed that all nuclear weapons from the FSU had been transferred to Russia as of 1996,
and that no such transaction had taken place.)46 There were also accounts of al-Qaeda
attempts to purchase uranium from Russia and Germany in 1998.47 In 2002, reports
indicated that diagrams of U.S. nuclear power plants had been discovered in al-Qaeda
facilities in Afghanistan.48 In January 2005, German authorities arrested suspected al-
Qaeda member Ibrahim Muhammad K. for attempting to purchase roughly 48 grams of
uranium in September 2002. Muhammad had allegedly approached an unspecified source
in Luxembourg to facilitate the transaction.49 Moroccan investigators reportedly un-
covered a plot by al-Qaeda affiliate group Salafia Jihadia to attack a French nuclear power
plant at Cap de la Hague, Normandy. Al-Qaeda members had allegedly been involved in
the plot.50
One major obstacle to the acquisition of a ‘‘ready-made’’ device is political will; it is
highly doubtful that any regime would transfer such a device to this terrorist network for
fear of discovery and subsequent armed retribution by the United States. Reports
regarding nuclear weapons development are mostly speculative and highly sensational,
although there have been numerous reports of attempts to acquire uranium on multiple
occasions.51 All available reports suggest that al-Qaeda has yet to acquire the requisite
amount of fissile material to construct a nuclear device. Equally important, it appears that
the network lacks the technical capability to assemble a nuclear device*even if it were to obtain many of the needed materials.
The group would need significant technical assistance from nuclear scientists in
order to manufacture a nuclear weapon. Of particular concern is the allegation that a small
number of Pakistani nuclear scientists have had contact with al-Qaeda over the past
decade. Specific reports allege that two Pakistani scientists transferred nuclear weapon
information to Osama bin Laden in the mid-to late 1990s.52 If these allegations are true,
such assistance could increase al-Qaeda’s nuclear potential significantly.
Recent Cases Involving CBRN Agents
Ricin Plots in London
On January 5, 2003, six men were arrested in Wood Green, North London, and charged
with attempting to ‘‘develop or produce a chemical weapon.’’53 The six men were
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 621
identified as Arab men from Algeria or other North African countries. Three days after the
arrests, a seventh man was detained in connection with the case. British authorities
reported that at least one of the suspects had trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan,
while the others may have participated in terrorist training exercises in Chechnya and the
Pankisi Gorge area of Georgia.54 The case quickly became world news after British
authorities reported the discovery of castor beans, equipment to process the beans, and
traces of ricin in the apartment shared by the original six suspects.55
Subsequent reports indicated that the men implicated in the ricin plot did indeed
maintain connections to the al-Qaeda network and that Osama bin Laden had been
directing a number of terrorist cells throughout Europe that were intent on producing
poison to be used in terrorist attacks. Despite these numerous allegations, the nature of
the London ricin plot remained in question.
On April 13, 2005, a London jury acquitted four of the suspects in the ricin case.
Information presented in the trial led to the conclusion that there had been no traces of
ricin discovered in the London apartment. While field equipment used by chemical experts
did test positive for ricin, subsequent laboratory tests revealed that the reading had been a
false positive.56 Furthermore, it appeared that the five-page document of crude
instructions on how to produce ricin, cyanide, and botulinum toxin had been copied
from the Internet, as opposed to having been taken from a terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan, as previously suspected. Subsequent investigations revealed that the lists of
chemical instructions discovered in the London apartment were direct translations from an
Internet site maintained in Palo Alto, California.57
The only suspect convicted in the trial was Kamel Bourgess, an Algerian who was
already serving time in prison for the murder of a British constable in connection with the
case.58 Reports indicate that Bourgess had planned to smear a ricin mixture on door
handles in order to cause casualties in North London.59 However, it appeared that
Bourgess was far from being able to carry out the attack, given the crude attempts to
produce the poison. Even if he had successfully produced ricin, the substance would not
be an appropriate agent to cause mass casualties. Since ricin is a biological toxin as
opposed to a bacteria or virus, it is not contagious and cannot spread rapidly between
individuals. The surest way to induce fatalities is to encourage inhalation or ingestion of
the substance in a powder form or after it is dissolved in a liquid. Ricin is not cutaneously
active.
Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq
Ansar al-Islam originated in Kurdish northern Iraq and is one of the most active Islamist
groups operating in Iraq since well before the 2003 coalition invasion. The group is
significant in that it is an al-Qaeda affiliate that has engaged in the production of both
biological and chemical agents, purportedly for use as terrorist weapons. Most reports
indicate that Ansar has worked with both cyanide and ricin; however, there is no evidence
to indicate that the group ever reached a stage of weaponization. Accordingly, it appears
that the group’s limited arsenal would have only been useful for targeted attacks or
assassinations and thus that it did not constitute a true WMD capability.
622 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
Available reports indicate that Ansar al-Islam had acquired cyanide over the past few
years, as well as a small amount of ricin, but they are unable to confirm the precise amount
of each substance or the degree to which the substances had been weaponized.60 Some
reports indicate that Ansar’s crude chemical weapons capability included a form of
‘‘cyanide cream’’ that ‘‘kills on contact.’’61 Other reports simply state that Ansar was in
possession of ‘‘cyanide,’’ without specifying storage details or any other information that
would indicate what type of cyanide was being used.
Still other reports claim that Ansar had produced or acquired ricin and had
conducted biological warfare experiments.62 One report even alleged that Ansar acquired
a quantity of VX smuggled through Turkey in the fall of 2001.63 While there is proof that
Ansar did acquire CB agents, technical details outlining the group’s involvement with such
agents remain vague and moderately consistent at best. Investigations of the laboratory
discovered in northern Iraq revealed that it was rudimentary and that the group was far
from achieving a real weapons capability.64
Ansar members claimed to have produced ricin, cyanide-based toxics, and aflatoxin
prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.65 Officials from the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) corroborated these reports, stating that Ansar members are trained in the
production of poisons in ‘‘encampments’’ in northern Iraq. Investigations by PUK and
coalition officials later revealed a makeshift laboratory that contained traces of ricin, as well
as equipment such as surgical masks, latex gloves, and beakers. After the invasion,
coalition forces also reportedly uncovered a ‘‘three-volume manual’’ that outlined steps for
conducting chemical and biological experiments. Specifics on the use of cyanide and ricin
were included in the manual.66 The group had allegedly tested both substances in
preparation for future use, including experiments on live animals.67
Ansar’s choice of ricin and cyanide, as well as the group’s failure to weaponize the
agents or develop adequate delivery systems, indicates that militants may have been
planning to conduct only limited attacks and/or assassinations. Both ricin and cyanide are
reasonable choices for a group that is planning to conduct a targeted attack because they
are easier substances to manipulate than some of their more virulent or unstable
counterparts. In addition, since very little would be needed for a limited attack, it makes
sense to choose agents that are easy to acquire and/or produce. Ricin is one of the easier
biological toxins to produce, while cyanide is a chemical that can be acquired from an
industrial complex. However, despite the deadly nature of these substances, neither can
be appropriately labeled as a weapon of mass destruction. Difficulties in weaponization
mean that such substances are suitable only for targeted assassinations, as opposed to
mass casualty attacks.
Experiments in Afghanistan
Numerous reports since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 have
indicated that al-Qaeda was involved in testing CB agents in makeshift laboratories
throughout Afghanistan. However, despite evidence pointing to attempts at CBW
production, it appears that that network was unable to weaponize CB agents for use in
an attack. Local Afghan sources reported in 1999 that bin Laden was using a laboratory in
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 623
Charassiab, south of Kabul, to produce chemical weapons.68 The same year, U.S. sources
reported that bin Laden had established crude facilities in Khost and Jalalabad,
Afghanistan, in order to test and produce chemical and biological weapons.69 In early
2002, American troops near Kandahar reported the discovery of an abandoned facility that
appeared to have been built to research/weaponize biological agents.70 Traces of ricin and
production instructions were also reportedly discovered in an al-Qaeda safe house.71 U.S.
investigators claimed that they uncovered laboratory equipment in a house near Kandahar
that would support ‘‘a very limited production of biological and chemical agents.’’72
Al-Qaeda affiliates in Afghanistan have reportedly researched how to use mustard
agent and cyanide as weapons of mass destruction.73 Confiscated documents also
reportedly showed al-Qaeda’s interest in producing sarin, mustard, and VX.74 Reports from
the late 1990s indicate that the network attempted to create a pesticide/nerve agent with
a very high absorption rate and that the substance was tested on dogs and rabbits.75
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda has conducted experiments using
crude chemical agents, some of which included the use of cyanide. One of the most telling
pieces of evidence is a training video uncovered by investigators in which a dog is
enclosed in a box and killed with a chemical substance believed to include cyanide.
Yet despite the myriad reports citing al-Qaeda’s efforts at chemical and biological
weapons production, all available evidence shows that the network worked only with
crude chemicals and was far from a true weapons capability. For one, investigators have
not reported the discovery of any kind of dispersal device, a main requirement for the use
of a chemical or biological agent for weapons purposes. Additionally, journalists searching
an al-Qaeda camp in Khost, Afghanistan discovered stacks of photocopied manuals
dealing with CB agents that were downloaded from the websites of American right-wing
groups.76 This lack of technical equipment and expertise is not indicative of a group that
poses an immediate WMD threat.
Evolution of al-Qaeda’s Attitude toward Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMD acquisition has been a recurring theme in bin Laden’s rhetoric*obvious in his steady claims that the Muslim world should achieve military parity with non-Muslims. On
May 11, 1998, just three days following India’s nuclear tests, Osama bin Laden stated, ‘‘We
call upon the Muslim nation and Pakistan* its army in particular*to prepare for the jihad. This should include a nuclear force.’’77 More than a year later, in reference to the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in December of 1999, bin Laden told Pakistani
journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘‘Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a
religious duty. If I indeed have acquired these weapons I am carrying out a duty. It would
be a sin for Muslims not to try and possess weapons that would prevent the infidels from
inflicting harm on Muslims.’’78
Initial Interest
Osama bin Laden’s initial interest in WMD production likely began around 1994 during his
stay in Sudan. During that time, bin Laden became increasingly militant and showed
624 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
interest in the acquisition of CBRN agents. His research into chemical weapons began in a
laboratory in Khartoum and was supported by elements of the ruling National Islamic
Front (NIF) and the Sudanese military.79 Furthermore, it was reported that bin Laden hired
an Egyptian nuclear scientist and was able to purchase one kilogram of uranium from
South Africa.80 Subsequently, an American official reported, ‘‘Osama [was] directly
involving himself with the Sudanese government, trying to get it to test poisonous gases
in case they could be tried against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.’’81
Some of bin Laden’s growing militancy may have been a result of personal
difficulties during this time. In February 1994, the Saudi Arabian government revoked his
Saudi citizenship and froze his financial assets as a reaction to his aggressive and overt
criticism of the monarchy. Later that year, the Saudis also induced his older brother, Bakr,
to denounce and condemn Osama on behalf of the bin Laden family. More significantly, it
is believed that in February 1994, Osama was the target of two failed assassination
attempts. The first failed attempt was carried out by the Saudi intelligence services, while
the second was conducted by al-Khulayfi, an angry member of the Egyptian Islamist group
al-Takfir Wal Hijra. A failed assassination attempt was also made in Khartoum’s central
market on the life of Osama’s eldest son, Abdullah.82 These events may have contributed
to bin Laden’s determination to carry out mass casualty attacks on his enemies.
Internal Debate within al-Qaeda Concerning WMD Acquisition
Subsequent to the formal union of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s
branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan on February 23, 1998, which
established ‘‘The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders,’’ a new
and more dangerous al-Qaeda transnational organization emerged.83 Following this union,
a series of meetings took place within al-Qaeda’s ruling body, Majlis al-Shura, concerning
the acquisition of a WMD capability. At this time, the organization’s leaders were
concerned about an all-out American assault on Afghanistan due to a perceived U.S. desire
to control Central Asia or in retaliation for al-Qaeda attacks against Western targets. The al-
Qaeda hierarchy was especially concerned with the prospects of American WMD
deployment to win the war in Afghanistan. It appears that initially, the al-Qaeda leadership
wanted to achieve WMD capability not as a first-strike option, but as a deterrent against
U.S. military might and a counterbalance against American and Israeli WMD arsenals. In
these meetings within bin Laden’s inner circle, members repeatedly raised the following
questions: ‘‘Who will protect the Arab Mujahideen in their last abode on the face of the
earth? How are they to be protected? Who is going to protect the people, the states, the
wealth and the Islam of Central Asia, who have scarcely escaped the assault of the ‘Red
Satan’, only to face a more sinister attack from Washington and Tel Aviv?’’84
Inside Majlis al-Shura, the hawks frequently asked,
Who would protect the Muslims from them [the United States and Israel]? Is it the UN or
the Security Council? Or is it America’s friends and allies among the Arab regimes? What
if Israel decided to use atomic bombs, chemical or biological weapons against an Arab or
Muslim capital? What if America decided in the near future to lay siege on Afghanistan,
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 625
with its dirty bombs and lethal weaponry? And what would be the Islamic reaction if
Afghani cities were targeted from America or Israel with Atomic bombs?85
As a result of these internal discussions within Majlis al-Shura, the leadership of al-Qaeda
decided to pursue a very ambitious strategy. Its ultimate goal was to obtain atomic
weapons and store them on American soil to retaliate immediately for prospective U.S.
aggression against Afghanistan or other Muslim lands. In addition, although it was clear to
the al-Qaeda leaders that any WMD they could obtain would be inferior to the existing U.S.
arsenal, they made the decision that the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons would be a priority for their organization.86
Within al-Qaeda’s ruling body, various factions voiced different attitudes toward the
value of the group’s prospective possession of WMD. Some believed that WMD are no
more than an empty threat, a ‘‘Jinni in a jar,’’ that no rational leadership would ever use.
Others argued that any WMD the network was able to acquire would not constitute a
strategic weapon, but a purely tactical weapon, because of its likely modest destructive
power and primitive qualities. A third faction argued that ‘‘weapons of mass destruction
would considerably enhance the fighting capability and moral influence of the Mujahideen
and the fighters of al-Qaeda. They are in dire need of such weapons to compensate for the
vulnerability of their military ordnance, the insufficiency of their numbers and their
growing isolation from their peoples.’’87 Several al-Qaeda leaders also envisioned WMD
paired with suicide attacks to maximize their effect.
Despite their differences, the one point on which the various factions within al-
Qaeda’s Majlis al-Shura unanimously agreed was their view that the United States was a
ferocious enemy but a dishonorable adversary. It would not hesitate to annihilate a weaker
opponent but would retreat in disarray if faced with a stronger enemy. To that end, the al-
Qaeda leadership agreed to continue to refer to CBRN agents despite their limited
operational benefit as weapons of mass destruction in order to sow fear and terror in the
minds of their enemies and to ‘‘bestow some credibility on the Mujahideen, and maybe
some respect, moral influence and an aura of invincibility in the minds of the people.’’88
Current Role of WMD in al-Qaeda’s Strategy
Since the late 1990s, changing realities in the Middle East have corresponded with
changes in al-Qaeda’s attitude toward the role of WMD. Since al-Qaeda’s leadership
decided to pursue WMD primarily as a deterrent and defensive weapon against possible
U.S. aggression and WMD deployment in Afghanistan and other Muslim and Arab lands,
various events have occurred that indicate al-Qaeda’s WMD policy has evolved from
defensive to offensive. The group is in fact aiming to use WMD as a first-strike weapon
against the United States and its allies. In 2001, following the 9/11 attacks that killed
roughly 3,000 American and other citizens, the United States and its allies invaded
Afghanistan and denied al-Qaeda its ‘‘last abode on the face of the earth.’’ Recently, many
senior members of al-Qaeda have been killed or captured, and bin Laden and al-Zawahiri
are on the run. In addition, al-Qaeda has evolved from an organization into a
decentralized, global movement made up of independent cells and international affiliates
626 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
who adhere to al-Qaeda’s doctrine and global vision but are not directly subordinate to
the commands of the parent organization.
Additionally, the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has changed the reality
of the region; al-Qaeda is no longer anticipating and preparing for a full-blown
confrontation with the United States. At this point, al-Qaeda is in the midst of a conflict,
which it aims to expand and intensify by inducing the United States to act more
aggressively in the region in the hopes of escalating Muslim antagonism toward the
West and increasing the appeal*and membership*of global jihadi organizations. The al-Qaeda leadership anticipates that new recruits will swell the ranks of these
jihadi affiliates and undermine the security and rule of secular or moderate Muslim
regimes (e.g., Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Libya). The
ultimate goal, as has been the case since the conception of al-Qaeda, is the overthrow of
these regimes.
Moreover, attacking American and other Western targets is seen by al-Qaeda as the
most effective strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and its Arab and
Muslim allies.89 Furthermore, in light of the open conflict currently under way between al-
Qaeda and the United States, coupled with the Western occupation of Iraq and
Afghanistan, al-Qaeda leaders see WMD attacks against the United States and the
resulting mass casualties as legitimate means of retribution for current and past killings of
Muslims in these countries. Bin Laden made this sentiment clear in November 2002 when
he stated: ‘‘This is an unfair division. The time has come for us to be equal . . . Just as you
kill, you are killed. Just as you bombard, you are bombarded. Rejoice at the harm coming
to you.’’90
Al-Qaeda’s assessment of the utility of a WMD capability has evolved from the
notion of a defensive tool designed to deter an American attack on Afghanistan and other
Muslim areas, to a first-strike weapon that should be deployed against the United States in
retribution for past and present killing of Muslims. The hope is that this first-strike
capability would also bring about a severe American reprisal that would only serve to
garner more support for Islamists in the Muslim world. Accordingly, the leadership of al-
Qaeda has recently obtained religious justification from a Muslim scholar to permit WMD
use against the United States. In May 2003, bin Laden likely prompted the respected and
well-known young Saudi Islamic scholar Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd to issue a fatwa
(religious decree) in support of such actions. In his 25-page document, ‘‘A Treatise on the
Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels,’’ Shaykh al-Fahd
empowered al-Qaeda with a fatwa and provided the religious justification needed to carry
out such an attack.
In his document Shaykh al-Fahd argued, ‘‘This matter is so obvious to Muslims that it
needs no demonstration . . . . Anyone who considers America’s aggression against Muslims
and their lands during the past decades . . . will conclude that striking her is permissible
merely on the rule of treating as one has been treated. Some brothers have totaled the
number of Muslims killed directly or indirectly by their weapons and come up with a figure
of nearly 10 million.’’91
Shaykh al-Fahd also argued in his treatise that in a state of jihad against infidels, the
mass killing of American civilians is also permissible. He stated, ‘‘Thus the situation in this
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 627
regard is that if those engaged in jihad establish that the evil of the infidels can be repelled
only by attacking them at night with weapons of mass destruction, they may be used even
if they annihilate all the infidels.’’92 In the conclusion of his treatise, Shaykh al-Fahd did not
limit his argument to targeting Western locations and civilians; he argued that while
usually the killing of other Muslims is forbidden by God, in the path of jihad it should
be permitted. He stated, ‘‘. . . as long as jihad has been commanded . . . and it can be
carried out only in this way [i.e., with Muslims being killed in attacks by Muslims], it is
permitted.’’93
This is an important landmark in the evolution of al-Qaeda’s view of and quest for a
WMD capability. As a religious organization and movement, al-Qaeda has always sought to
present itself as working within the limits of what is permissible in Islam and advocates
that open jihad against unbelievers is the duty of true Muslims. Prior to May 2003, al-
Qaeda leadership did not possess any religious justification to carry out a WMD attack on
the West or Western interests in the Middle East. However, Shaykh Al-Fahd’s fatwa has
removed religious constraints and has empowered al-Qaeda*at least in theory*with justification to carry out such attacks even if they result in mass casualties among Western
or Muslim civilians.
More recently, statements from al-Qaeda leaders left little to the imagination and
made it abundantly clear that if and when the movement were to acquire a credible WMD
capability, it would not hesitate to use such weapons against suitable targets. This new
direction was made obvious following the allegations that one of al-Qaeda’s cells in Jordan
intended to carry out a massive chemical attack in April 2004. After the seizure of large
amounts of explosives and chemical precursors by Jordanian security forces and the arrest
of several suspects, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the sponsor of this attack and bin Laden’s
lieutenant in Iraq, denied that the group had planned to use chemical weapons in the
attack. (Al-Zarqawi is the one-time head of al-Tawhid wal Jihad who, in October 2004,
swore allegiance to bin Laden and changed the name of his outfit to al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-
Rafidayn [al-Qaeda in the Land of two Rivers, i.e., Iraq].) Although al-Zarqawi claimed that
al-Qaeda did not possess WMD, he avowed unequivocally, ‘‘If we had such a bomb*and we ask God that we have such a bomb soon*we would not hesitate for a moment to strike Israeli towns, such as Eilat, Tel Aviv and others.’’94
These sentiments were echoed by another important jihadi thinker and operative,
Mustafa Sit Maryam Nasar, better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Musab al-Suri, who, in
December 2004, published the manuscript, ‘‘The International Islamic Resistance Call.’’95 In
this 1,600-page global jihadi blueprint and in his ‘‘Letter of Reply to the U.S. State
Department,’’ al-Suri enthusiastically argues that weapons of mass destruction should be
used against the United States and criticizes Osama bin Laden for not using weapons of
mass destruction in the 9/11 attacks. He states, ‘‘If I were consulted in the case of that
operation I would advise the use of planes in flights from outside the U.S. that would carry
WMD. Hitting the U.S. with WMD was and is still very complicated. Yet, it is possible
after all, with Allah’s help, and more important than being possible* it is vital.’’96 He adds, ‘‘The Muslim resistance elements [must] seriously consider this difficult yet vital
direction.’’97
628 SAMMY SALAMA AND LYDIA HANSELL
Al-Qaeda’s Evolving Organizational Structure and Implications for WMD Use
It is worth considering the intentions of al-Qaeda in light of the network’s transformation
into a decentralized organization. This evolution into a global movement with various
regional affiliates and autonomous cells increases the risk of an attack utilizing CBRN
agents, but decreases the likelihood of any individual cell obtaining a true mass-casualty
capability.
Three factors explain the heightened risk of a CBRN attack. First, since operational
decisions are currently made by the leaders of individual cells without consent from Majlis
al-Shura, these cells operate without oversight from a ruling council; thus, any cell is
theoretically free to pursue any course of action that it deems desirable or appropriate.
Second, cell leaders are likely to carry out a WMD attack as soon as they have the capability
to do so. This has been the case with conventional weapons, and there is no reason to
believe that cell leaders would delay an attack once they are armed with weaponized
CBRN agents. In addition, it may be in the best interest of cell leaders to precipitate an
attack in order to safeguard the virulence and/or potency of any biological or chemical
agent employed as a weapon. Third, the fatwa issued by Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd
in 2003 served as an open invitation to all al-Qaeda jihadis to deploy WMD against
Western interests when they are ready and able. This was the first semblance of religious
justification for the use of CBRN materials by al-Qaeda affiliates. Additionally, bin Laden’s
statement that the acquisition of nuclear and chemical weapons is a religious duty for all
Muslims will surely quell any remaining doubts among Salafi Islamists with regard to the
use of CBRN agents.
While the cellular nature of the organization may facilitate the acquisition and
deployment of CBRN agents in some ways, the same decentralized structure is likely to
prevent any one cell from developing a true mass-casualty capability using CBRN agents.
The result is that an individual cell is destined to have a more modest weapons capability
than the network as a whole. Individual cells are likely to acquire only low-end CBRN
agents, comprising a crude CBRN capability. As previously discussed, such a capability is
more suitable for targeted assassinations than for mass-casualty attacks.
One caveat to this argument is that the rank and file of al-Qaeda, and especially the
Egyptian cadre, are the most capable components of the al-Qaeda network, and thus
worthy of special attention. Al-Zawahiri and his cohorts have thus far evaded capture by
Western or allied entities and are likely to remain on the run, at least in the foreseeable
future. Given that the cellular structure of al-Qaeda greatly hinders monitoring efforts, it is
difficult to accurately assess the threat of this or any one faction. It is possible that the
Egyptian cadre is able to acquire or produce more advanced CBRN agents; such a prospect
would have serious implications for the security of Western entities around the globe.
How Are WMD Portrayed in al-Qaeda’s Literature?
Using the Internet to Export the Revolution
After 9/11, an array of al-Qaeda and pro-al-Qaeda websites have emerged on the Internet.
Currently, the al-Qaeda movement relies heavily on these websites to enhance its mission
AL-QAEDA AND WMD 629
and spread its message. Furthermore, many al-Qaeda affiliates, such al-Tahwid wal Jihad,
the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and many others, have
erected their own websites. While most pages on these websites contain religious
doctrines, ideological justification, reports of the tyranny of Arab regimes, and anti-
Western diatribes outlining historical Muslim grievances against Western powers, a select
number of these sources deals specifically with operational terrorist methods and tactics
that detail how to carry out terrorist attacks against potential targets and how to
manufacture conventional and unconventional weapons. One of the best ways to
ascertain information about al-Qaeda and assess its threat, intentions, and capabilities is
through active monitoring of various al-Qaeda websites.